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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY,
Personal Representative for the
Estate of Merlin R. Morrison,
Sr.,
Case No, 920533-CA

Petitioner/Appellant,

Priority No. 16

v.
MERLIN R. MORRISON, JR., and
EDNA R. MORRISON,
Respondent/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellees assert that the trial court was correct in refusing to look beyond the four corners of the deeds to determine the
intent of partners Merlin R. Morrison, Jr. ("Morrison, Jr.") and
Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. ("Morrison, Sr.") Appellees reach that
conclusion by virtually ignoring the Utah Partnership Act and by
relying on cases which are inapposite.

Under the clear language

of the Act, properties purchased with partnership funds belong to
the partnership, unless a contrary intention appears.
true regardless of the record title.

This is

The facts are uncontro-

verted in this case that the properties in question were purchased by Morrison Sr. and Morrison Jr. with partnership funds.

Appellees may dispute that the facts are uncontroverted on this
issue, but at the very least, there exists a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the properties were purchased with
partnership funds.
The next issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption that the properties belonged to the partnership also raises genuine issues of material fact.

Appellees

are saddled with the burden of showing a contrary intent.
Appellees never met this burden because the trial court, refusing
to look beyond the four corners of the deeds, never reached the
issue of intent.

Courts uniformly hold that record title alone

does not establish intent, a point appellees do not dispute.
Because there are genuine issues of material fact in this case,
the trial court clearly erred in granting summary judgment for
appellees.
Appellees suggest that West One is precluded from making
arguments concerning the use of partnership funds to purchase the
real properties.

Appellees are dead wrong.

West One persistent-

ly argued to the trial court the legal principles, theory and
policy that embody the Utah Partnership Act -- that partnership
property belongs to the partnership unless a contrary intention
is shown.

Courts uniformly hold that omitting a specific cita-

tion to a statute does not preclude a party from raising the
statute on appeal.

In this case, omission of a specific citation

2

to the Act is inconsequential.

Appellant properly cites on

appeal the statute and its underlying principles.1
ARGUMENT
I.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Appellees argue that West One's reliance on the legal
principles underlying the Partnership Act is misplaced because
there is no evidence that partnership funds were used to purchase
the three properties in question.

The record shows otherwise.

As cited in appellant's brief, there are numerous references
to Morrison, Jr.'s testimony that he and his father, Morrison,
Sr., financed and operated the properties like they did their
other business enterprises -- as a "partnership."
Morrison, Jr. at 25, 68-69 & 76; R. 125.)

(Depo. of

The partners had a

30-year partnership where they would contribute capital and

In their description of the course of proceedings, appellees state that the Morrisons1
motion to restrain West One's prosecution of this appeal was based on the fact that West
One had failed to consult the heirs with regard to the appeal. (Appellees' Brief, p. 3.)
This statement is inaccurate and unsupported by the record. Contrary to appellees'
statement, the supporting memorandum to the Morrisons' motion (attached to Appellees'
Brief, addendum No. 2) does not even mention, let alone assert, that West One had failed
to fully consult the heirs. In fact, Gilbert Bean, personal Trust Officer of West One Bank,
in the fall of 1991, notified by letter the heirs regarding the appeal.
Appellees also attempt to create the impression that this appeal is contrary to the
wishes of the majority of the heirs and only serves to waste the estate's assets. Appellees'
portrayal is disingenuous. Even if only one heir requested West One to appeal the trial
court's order, West One would be obligated to do so because the trial court was wrong. If
West One declined to appeal the trial court's order, it may well be in breach of its
fiduciary duties to the heir(s).
3

services to finance and operate numerous business enterprises.
In Morrison, Jr.'s own words, they "were always partners . . . ."
(Depo. of Morrison, Jr. at 25, Addendum No. 2, Appellant?s
Brief.)

Their partnership activities included the purchase of

the three subject real properties.

In his affidavit, Morrison,

Jr. testifies that he and Morrison, Sr. "jointly purchased" the
three real properties and that "various tax returns were filed
indicating a partnership" between them.
added).

(R. at 125) (emphasis

Morrison, Jr.'s testimony is unequivocal that he regard-

ed the purchase of the three real properties as another business
enterprise of the partners and that the subject properties
belonged to the partnership.
Appellees' description of Morrison, Jr. f s and Morrison,
Sr.'s partnership relationship is confusing.

Appellees assert

that because Morrison, Jr. and Morrison Sr. contributed half of
the funds to purchase the real properties they were "co-owners,"
not partners.

Appellees state that "Mr. Morrison, Jr. ! s testimo-

ny make [sic] it clear that he uses the term [partnership] as
synonymous with "co-owners."
omitted).

(Appellees' Brief, p. 9) (footnote

Appellees also state that "West One concedes that Mr.

Morrison, Jr. contributed half of the funds to purchase the
properties and in doing so must concede that the properties were
not purchased with partnership funds."
13. )
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(Appellees1 Brief, p.

Appellees' logic is specious, and reflects a misunderstanding of what a partnership is under the Utah Partnership Act.

As

stated in Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3, "[a] partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners, a business
for profit."

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1992) (emphasis added).

Appellees' own description of Morrison, Jr.'s and Morrison, Sr.'s
association contains a critical partnership element.
Appellees needlessly point out that Morrison, Jr. T s testimony did not accurately explain the full implications of a "partnership."

Morrison, Jr. testified that he thought he owned a 50%

interest in the properties.

(R. at 125.)

Appellees recite

general principles of partnership law that the partnership
actually holds a 100% interest in partnership property and two
partners each hold a 50% interest in the partnership.
(Appellees' Brief, p. 9-10.)

Appellees glean to this error in

Morrison, Jr.'s testimony to show that Morrison, Jr. could not
have intended that the properties belonged to the partnership.
Appellees overstate the significance of this testimony.

Morri-

son, Jr.'s description of partner ownership is understandable in
light of what appellees characterize as his "layman's" understanding of partnership law.

Morrison, Jr.'s testimony, however,

in no way evidences that he did not intend a partnership in the
legal sense.

His testimony is clear that the indicia of a

partnership existed between he and Morrison, Sr.:

the two men

had a long association as co-owners to finance and operate
5

businesses for profit, including the purchase of the real properties .
Because the partners purchased the properties with partnership funds, the trial court should have, as urged by West One,
looked beyond the four corners of the deeds to determine the
partners' intent.

Appellees respond that "West One also attempts

to have the Court speculate as to the intent of Mr. Morrison, Jr.
. . . "

(Brief of Appellees, p. 9.)

One's point.

Appellees misunderstand West

West One is not attempting to have this Court

speculate as to Morrison, Jr.'s intent.
this Court's role.

That obviously is not

West One is simply marshaling facts to show

that the partners regarded the property as partnership property,
or, at the very least, that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether the properties were purchased with partnership funds.

It is the trial court's responsibility to weigh the

evidence and determine the partners' intent.

The trial court,

however, refused to look beyond the record title to reach the
issue of intent.

This refusal was an error of law.

Accordingly,

the trial court's order of summary judgment should be reversed
and this case should be remanded for a trial on the factual
issues that are germane to the disposition of the subject real
properties.

6

II.
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE SUFFICIENTLY
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT
Appellees argue that West One failed to argue to the trial
court the theory that the three properties at issue belonged to
the partnership because the properties were purchased with
partnership funds.

Appellees either ignore or overlook numerous

references to this theory in the record below.

The issue of the

existence of a partnership and the use of partnership funds to
purchase the properties was briefed by West One in its Memorandum
in Opposition to appellee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The issue also permeated the discussion at oral argument and is
central to the decision at hand.2
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this
Court held that
[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has
been submitted to the trial court and the
trial court has had the opportunity to make
findings of fact or law.
Id. at 801.

In the present case, West One sufficiently raised

the issue that property purchased with partnership funds belongs
to the partnership although it did not cite to a specific statutory provision.

"Appellees state that West One has made "several arguments" which were not made to
the trial court. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 10-12.) The only such argument identified by
appellees was that concerning the use of partnership funds to purchase the subject real
properties. The other argument(s) to which appellees refer are a mystery.
7

The lack of a specific statutory citation to the trial court
does not, however, preclude West One from citing to that statute
on appeal.

General reference to the legal principle(s) underly-

ing the statute sufficiently preserves the relevant issues.
Appellate courts uniformly adhere to this principle.

In Danes v.

Automobile Underwriters, Inc., 307 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App,
1974), the Indiana court was faced with a situation very similar
to the one at hand.

In Danes, the plaintiff, who was acting as

guardian for her minor child, sought a declaration that a previous release of her daughter's claims against an uninsured motorist pursuant to a settlement entered into by the plaintiff be
declared void.

Although the plaintiff argued that the release

was "'void ab initio' as against public policy," the plaintiff
failed to cite to an Indiana statute which specifically required
that a compromise or settlement of a minor's claim is valid only
when approved by the court.

Id. at 903.

The plaintiff first

referred to the statute itself in the plaintiff's appellate
brief.

Although the defendant insurer asserted that the citation

of the statute gave rise to a new issue on appeal which was not
before the trial court, the appellate court disagreed stating
that the plaintiff
persistently argued that a minor's claim may
not be compromised or settled without court
approval . . . .
Questions within the issues
and before the trial court are before the
appellee (sic) court, and new arguments and

8

authorities may with strict priority be
brought forward.
Id. at 905 (emphasis added).

The court further mentioned that

[i]t is clear that: " . . . the courts of a
state will take judicial notice of its own
public statutes and that it is accordingly
unnecessary to plead them or to set out the
contents or substance thereof."
Id. at 905 (quoting Chicago & Calument Dist. Transit Co., Inc. v.
Stravatzakes, 156 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 1959)). 3
In Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. No. 49, 516 P.2d 1099
(Wash. Ct. App. 1973), the Washington court similarly held that a
failure specifically to cite to the statute did not preclude the
appellant from bringing the statute to the court's attention
during the appeal.

Id. at 1103 n.4.

In Wojt, the plaintiff

challenged the legal sufficiency of the stated causes for his
discharge from one of the defendant's schools, but failed to cite
to the court a statute that required the promulgation of evaluative guidelines concerning teaching and other classroom-related
performance.

In holding that the plaintiff could cite to the

court the statute for the first time on appeal, the court stated
that the primary issue before the trial court was the legal
sufficiency of the stated causes for discharge and, accordingly,
"[a]11 statutes and authorities which bear upon the issue of the
In addition, although the court noted that had plaintiff ? s counsel specifically called
the trial court's attention to the statute the trial court might well have resolved the
matter differently, the court put no weight on the counsel's oversight. Danes, 307 N.E.2d
at 905.
9

sufficiency of the causes are therefore properly before this
court."

Id. (emphasis in original).

Other courts have also held that the failure to specifically
cite the statute at trial did not preclude its citation during
appeal.

See, e.g., Independent Nat 1 ! Bank v. Westmoor Elec.

Inc., 795 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed
to cite Arizona statute providing for set-off, court found that
defendant's general argument concerning set-off sufficiently
preserved argument for appeal);

Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 686

P.2d 79 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (general reference to statute of
limitations, but failure specifically to cite statute, did not
preclude its use during appeal).
In the present case, although West One did not cite Utah
Code Ann. § 48-1-5 to the trial court, West One did persistently
argue the theory of section 48-1-5.

West One's primary argument

was that the trial court should look at the intent of the partners because the properties belonged to the partnership.

The

theory of section 48-1-5, was thereby preserved for argument on
appeal.

During the oral argument of defendants' motion for

summary judgment, the following discourse took place:
Mr. Sessions: We're saying: No, wait a
minute. We're entitled to look behind the
four corners of the documents; number one,
because Mr. Morrison was in a partnership
with his son, the partnership that they had
covered five separate business transactions

10

The Court: So if you prove there !s a partnership--! fm just trying to follow along,
suppose you are able to prove there was a
partnership and these properties belonged in
this partnership; why couldn't they still be
in joint tenancy and then be back to where we
are now, and that is interpreting the language of the deed?
Mr. Sessions: The reason why is if in fact
it is a 50/50 partnership, just for purposes
of argument, in fact 50 percent of the property that is owned in the partnership would
belong to the estate.
The Court: Why would it if--I agree with you
on a general basis, 50/50 partnership, they
each owned 50 percent. But if they agreed to
hold some of the real property in joint tenancy, why can't they do that so that upon the
death of one of them it just passes along?
Mr. Sessions: I think this is the key and
the answer, as least as I view the answer.
The easy and quick answer is yes, you can
hold property in joint tenancy, no question
about that. But if the parties really intended that it wasn't to be joint property at
all in the sense that it passed to the survivor upon the death of the first to die, but
it was intended by the parties to be something else in this case, partnership property. Then if it is the intention of the parties that ought to be enforced.

The Court: All you've shown here is they
intended this be part of the partnership-Mr. Sessions:

Exactly.

(Trans., pp. 28-32, Addendum No. 1.)
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The above discussion between the trial court and West One ? s
counsel shows counsel's emphasis on the fact that the properties
were partnership properties.

Accordingly, the court was com-

pelled to ascertain the intent of the partners in order to
determine the disposition of the properties.

There is no ques-

tion that the trial court understood that West One was arguing
that the property was purchased with partnership funds and is
presumed to be partnership property, absent a contrary intent.
As noted above, the court asked:
[SJuppose that you are able to prove that it was a
partnership and these properties belonged in this
partnership; why couldn't they still be in joint
tenancy and then be back to where we are now, and
that is interpreting the language of the deed?

All you've shown here is that they intended
that this be part of the partnership . . . .
(Trans, at 29-31, Addendum No. 1.)

The court further stated that

. . . just because someone intended that to
say something different, if it's clear, I'm
not sure the law allows me to go behind and
change it. But Mr. Sessions is saying, yes,
that's true. Citing the case, the fact these
were partnership assets injects a new element
in this.
(Trans, at 39, Addendum No. 1.)
The trial court was well aware of West One's argument that
because the property was partnership property, the property
belonged to the partnership absent a contrary intent.

The

court's discussion with counsel during argument demonstrates this
12

awareness.

Appellees' argument to the contrary wholly lacks

merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in West One's briefs, West One
respectfully submits that the trial court's summary judgment be
reversed and the case be remanded for a factual determination
whether the appellees can rebut the presumption that the three
subject real properties were and are properties of the partnership.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1992.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

Clark'W. Sess:
Dean C. Andreassen
Michael T. Roberts
Attorneys for Appellant
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